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Democracy, Human Rights, and Islamic 
Family Law in Post-Soeharto Indonesia 
 
MARK CAMMACK, ADRIAAN BEDNER, AND STIJN VAN HUIS* 
 
 
Abstract  This article examines the developments in Indonesian family law in the aftermath 
of the political transition that occurred in 1998. Its focus is on the position of the Islamic courts 
and the role of the women’s movement as a driver of reform. Combining literature on gender, 
Islam, and the state in Indonesia with new material such as divorce rates, cases of the 
Constitutional Court, and law reform initiatives, the authors argue that the family law reform 
processes already underway before 1998 have not changed much and have continued to lead to 
more state control of Islamic family law. Yet, even though the reforms since 1998 have not 
directly targeted family law, they have unleashed processes of liberalization, democratization 
and decentralization that have emboldened Indonesian women in the exercise of their rights and 
have invigorated debates over further reform. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On May 21, 1998, Indonesian President Soeharto resigned from office after more than three 
decades in power. Popular dissatisfaction with the Soeharto regime had been building for years, 
but deepened dramatically as a result of hardship caused by the financial crisis that struck the 
region in 1997. Anti-government protests that began in mid-1997 gradually spread across the 
country and became more intense. On May 12, 1998 the protests turned violent after police fired 
on students demonstrating at Trisakti University in West Jakarta, killing six people and 
injuringtwenty. The Trisakti shootings sparked mass demonstrations across the country and the 
situation rapidly spiraled out of control. Some of the protestors directed their anger at 
Indonesians of Chinese descent, long scapegoated as a symbol of economic injustice in 
Indonesia. Soeharto resigned nine days after the shootings, but not before several thousand 
Indonesians had lost their lives and billions of dollars of property had been destroyed.  
The momentous events of 1998 in Indonesia have obvious parallels in the political 
upheavals that shook the Middle East a decade later. Similar to the other contributions to this 
series, this article examines developments of Islamic family law in the aftermath of a 
fundamental political transformation. The Indonesian women’s movement, which emerged in the 
early twentieth century contemporaneously with Indonesian nationalism, has been an important 
force for reform throughout the country’s history. The popular movement that forced Soeharto to 
resign, known in Indonesia as Reformasi, was inspired by the ideals of constitutionalism, 
democracy, and human rights. Although family law was not specifically targeted, the Reformasi 
movement unleashed processes of liberalization, democratization, and decentralization that have 
emboldened Indonesian women in the exercise of their divorce rights and have invigorated
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 debates over family law reform. Even if these debates tend to be increasingly couched in Islamic 
terms, the ideal of substantive equality between men and women has remained unchanged.  
The discussion that follows is divided into three parts. In the next section, we begin with 
a discussion of the pre-1998 development of Indonesian Islamic legal institutions, family law, 
and the Indonesian women’s movement. The second section summarizes the changes 
implemented as a part of the Reformasi agenda and the role of women in the Reformasi 
movement. The final section discusses developments in Islamic family law in the post-Reformasi 
period, which arguably started in 2002. We conclude with some brief reflections on the long-
term trends and future direction of women’s rights and Islamic family law in Indonesia.  
 
 
Background 
 
Marriage Law, Islamic Courts and the Women’s Movement in Indonesia Before Independence 
 
The basic features of the Indonesian Islamic legal system were put in place during the period of 
Dutch colonial rule. The legal system created by the Dutch for the colonies in Southeast Asia 
during their more than 350 year-presence was primarily personal rather than territorial.
1
 This 
meant that one’s ethnicity rather than one’s place of residence determined which law was 
applicable. For marriage and divorce of the Indonesian part of the population this was customary 
and Islamic law.  
Historically, the social and legal standing of women in what is now Indonesia was 
somewhat stronger than in many other parts of the world, including in western countries.
2
 This 
relatively strong position of women in society was reflected in the judicial practices of the 
Islamic courts. Perhaps the most significant doctrinal development was the incorporation of 
customary marital property rules into Islamic law that granted a wife a share of all property 
acquired through the efforts of either spouse during the course of the marriage.
3
 Islamic courts in 
Southeast Asia also developed means for women to obtain a divorce beyond those available to 
women in most other parts of the Muslim world. One commonly used divorce option for women 
was the use of the taklik talak or suspended repudiation.
4
 This involved the pronouncement of a 
promise by the husband at the time of the marriage that a repudiation would automatically occur 
should he commit certain stipulated acts. By at least the end of the nineteenth century, the use of 
the taklik talak was pervasive across the archipelago. The conditions that would give rise to a 
repudiation were subject to negotiation and varied from place to place, but a more or less 
standard set of stipulations were commonly used.
5
  
                                                             
1
 Soedargo Gautama, “The Marriage Laws of Indonesia with Special References to Mixed Marriages,” in Essays in 
Indonesian Law, ed. Soedargo Gautama (Jakarta: Citra Aditya Bakti, 1991). 
2
 See generally Jane Atkinson and Shelly Errington, Power and Difference: Gender in Island Southeast Asia 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
3
 R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack, eds., Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). The institution of joint marital property was only formally 
recognized by statute with the passage of the National Marriage Act in 1974, but Islamic tribunals throughout 
Muslim Southeast Asia had been applying the doctrine at least since the beginning of the twentieth century and in 
many regions probably longer. 
4
 C. Snouck Hurgronje, The Acehnese, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1906), 2 vols. 
5
 A sampling of taklik talak formulas used in various regions can be found in Cora Vreede-de Stuers, The 
Indonesian Woman: Struggle and Achievements (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1960), Appendices A-D. 
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Disputes regarding family law could be brought before various types of customary courts 
or before Islamic courts. The current system of Islamic courts in Indonesia is directly traceable to 
a system of Islamic tribunals created by the Dutch at the end of the nineteenth century on Java 
and Madura. A royal decree promulgated in 1882 provided for the establishment of district-level 
Islamic councils charged with the task to decide disputes concerning matrimonial law and 
inheritance.
6
 The chief religious officer in the district – the penghulu – was designated as chair of 
the court. The council was to include between three and eight religious scholars serving as 
member judges – including the chair. In the 1930s the Dutch established an appeals tribunal for 
the courts on Java and Madura, and also created additional first instance courts and an appeals 
court in the Banjarmasin region of Kalimantan.
7
 Elsewhere in the archipelago, the local 
authorities administered Islamic law through institutions specially created for the adjudication of 
family law and other matters.
8
 These tribunals had the same collegial structure as the courts 
established by the Dutch and relied on a generally common set of Shafiʿi texts as authority for 
their decisions. 
The court reforms and expansion carried out by the Dutch in the 1930s were 
accompanied by a number of important initiatives relating to the substantive law applied to 
Muslims in the colony. One such initiative related to matrimonial law. In 1937 the colonial 
government introduced a draft marriage law entitled “Ordinance Project for the Regulation of 
Matrimonial Legislation of the Muslim Population.”9 Among the most important and significant 
proposals in the draft was a procedure whereby a wife could obtain a judicial decree of divorce 
should her husband marry another wife. However, this provoked such criticism from a number of 
Muslim organizations that the proposal was withdrawn. By contrast, the Marriage Ordinance 
Project had strong support from secular-oriented elements of the women’s movement. Since they 
were also part of the nationalist movement, their alliance with the Dutch authorities was tenuous, 
but these secular women’s organizations were to remain a critical agent for change after 
independence   
 
The Indonesian Women’s Movement and Islam 
 
While the position of women in Islamic marriage law as found in practice and applied by the 
Islamic courts was much better in the Netherlands Indies than in most contemporary Muslim 
countries, their inequality in marriage and divorce helped to establish a women’s movement. 
This movement would become the main driver for change in marriage law and the main 
adversary of the conservative Islamic establishment in this matter.
10
 Its roots are usually traced 
back to the Javanese noblewoman Kartini (1879-1904), whose writings were the first to address 
the issues that would dominate the agenda of women’s rights activists for the century to come: 
early marriage, polygamy, divorce rights, free choice of spouse, equal rights in education, equal 
                                                             
6
 Vreede-de Stuers, The Indonesian Woman: Struggle and Achievements, 100-101. 
7
 Supomo, “The Future of Adat Law in the Reconstruction of Indonesia,” in Southeast Asia in the Coming World, 
ed. Philip W. Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1953), 78-79. 
8
 Supomo, “The Future of Adat Law,” 73-74. 
9
 Vreede-de Stuers, The Indonesian Woman: Struggle and Achievements, 108-109. 
10
 Following Elizabeth Martyn, The Women's Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia: Gender and Nation in a New 
Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11, we conceive of the women’s movement as individuals, informal 
groups and formalized associations that “seek to represent women’s collective, articulating women’s demands and 
acting to address specific female disadvantage within society.” See also Susan Blackburn, Women and the State in 
Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11-12. 
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citizenship, and the improvement of women’s socio-economic status.11 The latter three aims may 
be categorized as “practical gender interests” and have traditionally commanded a high degree of 
unanimity within the movement. They moreover overlapped with the agenda of the nationalists, 
who sought to realize similar goals for all Indonesians living under the colonial government. 
The agreement within the women’s movement in pursuing the practical interests of 
women did not apply to “strategic gender interests,”12 which had to do with the Islamic marriage 
law and its implementation through Islamic councils. These interests led to serious public debate, 
including among women themselves. As early as the 1920s, soon after the first organizations 
favoring women’s emancipation had been established, ideological differences on family law 
became visible, pitching women’s rights activists pursuing a liberal agenda against those inspired 
by socially conservative readings of Islam. This division has led scholars to make a distinction 
between Islamic and non-Islamic organizations, the latter usually being referred to as secular.
13
  
At the time of Indonesian independence (1945) and for the first several decades 
afterward, Islam on the populous and politically dominant island of Java conformed to the 
pattern described by Clifford Geertz in his Religion of Java.
14
 Geertz described Islam in 1950s 
Java as consisting of two basic variants: one variant–the abangan–was characterized by a 
syncretic mix of Islamic and indigenous beliefs and practices, and an emphasis on communal 
social values and religious mysticism. The other variant–the santri–was characterized by an 
emphasis on doctrinal rationalization and purity, a more individualistic social ethic, and a 
generally legalistic approach toward religious observance. The santri group was further divided 
between “modernists” as represented by Muhammadiyah and “traditionalists,” represented by 
Nahdlatul Ulama. More importantly for present purposes, the abangan-santri divide more or less 
corresponded with the division of opinion over marriage law. Muslims from santri backgrounds 
generally favored marriage laws based on Islamic doctrine, while abangan Muslims preferred 
customary law (adat).  
Indonesian Islam changed in fundamental ways over the second half of the twentieth 
century. The framework proposed by Geertz is of questionable value for understanding 
Indonesian society today, as the abangan have generally moved towards more mainstream 
doctrinal understandings of Islam. While it no longer conforms to religious orientation, the 
distinction between groups favoring marriage laws based on Islam and those favoring secular-
based marriage laws has been a persistent feature of the debate. 
The main controversy both before World War II and long afterwards concerned whether 
polygamy should be allowed or not.
15
 During the first phase of the women’s movement, which 
lasted until the Japanese occupation in 1942, the overarching concern of providing support to the 
nationalist cause held the movement together, even if at times emotions regarding the question 
                                                             
11
 See Blackburn, Women and the State in Indonesia; Martyn, The Women's Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia, 
32, 34; Kathryn Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2009), 34. 
12
 See on this distinction Maxine Molyneux, "Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, 
and Revolution in Nicaragua,” Feminist Studies, 11:2 (1985), 227-254. 
13
 Blackburn, Women and the State in Indonesia, 15. While the word “secular” is perhaps appropriate as a 
description of the non-Islamic group’s approach toward law, the division between those favoring marriage laws 
based on Islamic doctrine and those who did not generally corresponds with a division existing among different 
groups of Muslims. This includes organizations on another religious basis, for instance Catholic or Protestant. 
14
 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
15
 Saskia Wieringa, Sexual Politics in Indonesia (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2002), 67; Martyn, The Women's 
Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia, 35. 
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whether polygamy should be prohibited ran high.
16
 The tensions caused by disagreement over 
polygamy were lessened by a common commitment to the agenda of promoting “practical 
gender interests” on education and socio-economic advancement. It was also these practical 
interests that unified the movement as a whole irrespective of the secular, socialist, Catholic, 
Islamic or other basis of the particular organizations. Another important unifying factor was that 
all of these groups, even the most radical, shared a common outlook on women’s emancipation. 
All elements within the women’s movement subscribed to the decidedly modest view that the 
primary role and responsibility of women was towards their (nuclear) family. This outlook has 
continued to be characteristic of Indonesian women’s organizations to the present day.17 
 
Developments After Independence 
 
The Japanese abolished all of the existing women’s organizations after their invasion of the 
Netherlands Indies in 1942.
18
 Nevertheless, the women’s movement came to play a crucial role 
in the fight for independence against the Dutch following the Japanese surrender, and therefore 
the new Indonesian Republican government could not entirely ignore its demands for reform 
even if those demands were not fulfilled.
19
 The spirit of the revolution and the democratic nature 
of the Indonesian state opened up new opportunities for social change and led to a flurry of 
activity. The 1945 Constitution, adopted immediately after the Declaration of Independence on 
17 August, generally had a conservative character. Women were granted the right to vote,
20
 
however, and the existence of broad support for the rights of women was demonstrated by the 
fact that temporary constitutions adopted in 1949 and 1950 included a complete set of human 
rights relevant to women’s emancipation. Moreover, all of these constitutions subscribed to the 
multi-religious nature of Indonesia, denying the wish of important segments of the Islamic 
movement to make Islam the foundation of the state. The developmental, modernizing agenda of 
the Indonesian government seemed to open up excellent opportunities for further improvement 
of the position of women. In the socio-economic sphere some objectives were indeed realized, 
but, as we shall see, the efforts to effect changes regarding the strategic gender interests in 
marriage law and Islamic courts (formerly the councils) were to little or no avail.  
This lack of change was largely due to the institutionalization of Islam in the post-
independence state. Of major importance was the establishment of a Ministry of Religion, which 
provided the santri community with a source of government patronage and therefore soon 
became a santri stronghold.
21
 It was to this ministry that during the first year of independence the 
supervisory authority over the Islamic courts was transferred. This proved vitally important to 
the survival of the Islamic judiciary and the preservation of a role for Islamic doctrine in 
Indonesian law. Together with Islamic political parties, the Ministry of Religion provided the 
                                                             
16
 Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 48-49; Martyn, The Women's Movement in Postcolonial 
Indonesia, 30, 42. 
17
 It even applied to the post-war radical left organization Gerwani (Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in 
Indonesia, 57). See also Martyn, The Women's Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia, 98. 
18
 The Japanese replaced them by a single organization called Fujinkai, which “promoted conservative models of 
domesticated femininity” (Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 49). 
19
 Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 50-51; Martyn, The Women's Movement in Postcolonial 
Indonesia, 46-48. 
20
 Martyn, The Women's Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia, 55. 
21
 Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia, 59-60. 
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Islamic courts with a base of support without which they would likely not have survived.
22
 This 
also enabled the Islamic courts to successfully resist efforts during the first three decades after 
independence to incorporate them as a panel of the civil courts or abolish them altogether. The 
Islamic judiciary not only survived but expanded. With the use of administrative regulations that 
did not require legislative approval, the Ministry of Religion was able to acquire control over 
tribunals established by local authorities and create new courts in areas of the country where they 
did not previously exist.
23
 
The influence of women’s organizations on these developments was limited. Some 
leaders of women’s organizations were members of parliament and thus in a position to influence 
the legislative agenda. However, they remained unrepresented in the Ministry of Religion, and 
very few women entered other segments of the bureaucracy or assumed a position in the 
government. Ideological positions associated with the political parties, moreover, tended to 
overshadow the common goals of the women’s movement and therefore reduced its effectiveness 
as a whole. According to Martyn, “women MPs would not necessarily represent women’s 
interests,”24 and, eventually, the failure of marriage law reforms was a conspicuous result. 
In this era, most of the energy of women’s activists was directed at reform of marriage 
law rather than the Islamic courts. Efforts to codify Indonesian marriage law began shortly after 
independence but foundered over disagreement on the question of whether there should be a 
single marriage law applicable to all Indonesians–the approach favored by women’s groups and 
abangan-oriented nationalists–or separate statutes for each of the country’s religious groups–the 
approach favored by the Ministry of Religion.
25
 This situation did not change much after 1959 
when Soekarno replaced the system of parliamentary democracy with his authoritarian Guided 
Democracy. Agenda-building processes for legal reform became much more difficult under the 
new regime, and Soekarno’s government was not particularly interested in women’s issues–even 
if its revolutionary rhetoric in principle promoted gender equality. The limited progress towards 
this goal that did occur mostly related to customary rather than religious law.
26
 One notable 
exception was the appointment of women to serve as member judges on the Islamic courts. 
Despite criticism from conservative Muslims, the Ministry of Religion began appointing women 
to serve as judges in the 1950s, and by the mid-1960s fifteen women were serving as judges in 
the Islamic courts.
27
 This provided a potential inroad for introducing a female perspective into 
                                                             
22
 Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia, 63-75. 
23
 Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia, 79-92. 
24
 Martyn, The Women's Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia, 113. 
25
 A statute passed in 1946 provided for registration of Muslim marriage and divorce, but the law did not treat the 
substance of Muslim matrimonial law. In an effort to promote uniformity in decision-making, the Ministry of 
Religion designated 13 fiqh texts to be used as references by the courts. Minister of Religious Affairs Instruction 
4/1947 moreover ordered Islamic registrars not to register child marriages (Robinson, Gender, Islam and 
Democracy in Indonesia, 60). Two competing proposals were debated briefly in 1958, after a female member of 
parliament named Soemari from the Indonesian Nationalist Party presented a marriage law bill based on the secular-
nationalist model. The government responded by introducing a draft Muslim marriage law that had been in 
preparation by the Ministry of Religion for several years. The two proposals were debated over a period of three 
days but never put to a vote. Martyn, The Women’s Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia, 139. 
26
 For instance when the Supreme Court ruled that “in line with modern times” men and women should enjoy equal 
inheritance rights under customary law (Daniel S. Lev, "The Supreme Court and Adat Inheritance Law in 
Indonesia,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 11:2 (1962), 205-224. 
27
 Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia, 110. We are not aware of any source containing information on the number of 
Islamic court judges in all of Indonesia in the mid-1960s. But because there were about 150 Islamic courts at the 
time and because the courts typically consisted of one full-time judge and about five “honorary” judges, the total 
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the courts. Measured against the objectives of the secular women’s organizations, however, this 
amounted to little. The single most influential women’s organization, Gerwani, rather than 
maintaining its focus on issues specific to women, found itself drawn further into the communist 
fight for the general revolutionary cause.
28
 As a result, despite repeated efforts to reform Islamic 
marriage law, none of the many marriage law proposals was acted upon. 
It took another regime change to revive the women’s movement’s efforts in pursuing the 
strategic part of their agenda in marriage law reform, such as curbing or eliminating early 
marriage, unilateral divorce and polygamy. Soeharto’s ascent to power and the massacre of 
communists in 1965 and 1966 drastically changed the landscape of women’s organizations. 
Gerwani was vilified and eliminated, but Soeharto initially showed more sympathy for the 
remaining secular-oriented groups than for those inspired by Islam. This paved the way for 
another attempt at producing a new marriage bill.  
The impasse between abangan-oriented nationalists and santri supporters of Islamic law 
that had stalled progress on marriage law reform in the 1950s was broken when President 
Soeharto tried to bypass the Ministry of Religion and other representatives of santri interests and 
force through a uniform national law in July 1973. The proposal set out a uniform body of 
marriage and divorce rules applicable to Indonesians of all religions. It required registration for a 
valid marriage, declared unilateral divorce to be contrary to the equality of men and women 
within marriage,
29
 and made divorce available only by decision of the court and upon a finding 
of statutory grounds.
30
 On the question of polygamy, the most divisive issue, the proposal stated 
that marriage is in principle between one man and one woman,
31
 but allowed for polygamy in 
some circumstances and with judicial approval.
32
 The enforcement of the statute was assigned to 
the civil courts, which would have eliminated entirely the role of the Islamic courts in the 
regulation of Muslim marriage and divorce. 
Soeharto’s gambit backfired; the plan accomplished the very opposite of what was 
intended. The proposal provoked angry opposition, and Soeharto apparently realized that he had 
overreached.
33
 While the revised bill that was eventually enacted is described as a compromise, it 
was not one favorable to the position of Soeharto and the secular nationalists. Though the 
intention of its sponsors was just the opposite, the 1974 Marriage Act laid the foundation for a 
thorough confessionalization of the law of marriage. 
The text of the 1974 Marriage Act is highly ambiguous–deliberately so, in our view. It 
confirms the primacy of religion as the basis for marriage and ideologically the law reinforces 
male dominance by labeling husbands as “the head of the household.”34 On the other hand, the 
1974 Marriage Act also was a major step forward for women’s rights. While the religious nature 
of marriage prevailed, polygamy was (and still is) only allowed upon the following conditions: 
the first wife cannot fulfill her duties as a wife, or she is handicapped or suffering from an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
number of Islamic judges nation-wide was probably somewhere between 1000 and 2000. Women judges therefore 
comprised about 1 percent of the Islamic judiciary. 
28
 Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 54. 
29
 This was stated in the elucidation that is typically included with Indonesian statutes. 
30
 Articles 40, 41, 42. 
31
 Article 3(a). 
32
 Articles 3(b), 4, 5. 
33
 Atho Mudzhar reports that the decision by Soeharto not to press for approval of the proposal was made after he 
received a visit from two prominent religious leaders from the Nahdlatul Ulama. Mohamad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-
Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 1975-1988 (1993). 
34
 Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 71. 
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incurable illness, or she cannot bear children. Consent of the first wife is moreover mandatory 
(and if applicable also from the second and/or third wife), while the candidate-polygamist must 
prove that he can provide for all of them and that he will treat all his wives and children fairly. 
Only upon the fulfillment of these conditions can the Islamic court grant permission for a 
polygamous marriage. From a practical perspective, the more important developments included 
the requirement that a husband could only obtain a divorce in court, while a wife was granted 
equal rights to petition for a divorce. Yet what was originally intended as a secular law of 
marriage and divorce came gradually to be interpreted by Islamic scholars and judges as state 
endorsement of a version of Islamic law. 
Steps by the Soeharto government to prevent polygamy among civil servants, instigated 
by his wife Siti Hartinah and the women’s organization of female officials and officials’ wives, 
Dharma Wanita,
35
 further reinforced the idea that the secular women’s organizations had finally 
achieved a position in which they could realize some of their agenda. This, however, proved to 
be unwarranted. Ironically, Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ regime supported marriage law reform in 
favor of women, but at the same time promoted an conservative ideology of what has been called 
state ibuism or “motherhood,” emphasizing the primary role of women as loving mothers and 
wives and supporters of their families, in line with their “biological disposition” (kodrat). The 
regime went much further in this than the secular women’s movement had ever done. Such an 
approach was also decidedly at odds with the differences found in patterns of gender relations 
throughout Indonesia where women were often involved in agriculture and other economic 
pursuits.
36
 In promoting this ideology the New Order established the previously mentioned 
Dharma Wanita, a counterpart to the civil servants’ association (Korps Pegawai Negeri), with 
mandatory membership for both female civil servants and the wives of male civil servants. 
Dharma Wanita was plainly not disposed to become a driver of further reform.
37
 Existing 
women’s organizations were abolished or had the scope of their actions seriously curtailed.38 
Although the regime upgraded the Office of Women’s Affairs to the status of a full ministry in 
1983, and despite the fact that gradually more women came to hold positions in the government 
and the bureaucracy, they could do little to change the New Order’s male hegemony.39 
Another important development related to Islamic law occurred in the mid-1980s when 
Soeharto began courting Muslim interests as part of a new political strategy. During the first half 
of Soeharto’s more than thirty years in power, the regime’s policies were decidedly not friendly 
to the interests of santri Muslims.
40
 That changed during the latter half of the regime when 
Soeharto began seeking the support of Muslim groups in response to declining support from the 
military.
41
 This new Muslim strategy supported further changes to both substantive marriage law 
and the Islamic courts. These were in large part a consequence of changes brought about by the 
                                                             
35
 Sonja van Wichelen, Religion, Politics and Gender in Indonesia: Disputing the Muslim Body (Routledge, 2010), 
74. 
36
 Van Wichelen, Religion, Politics and Gender in Indonesia, 15-16; Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in 
Indonesia, 31-32, 76-77. 
37
 Saraswati Sunindyo, “Murder, Gender and the Media: Sexualizing Politics and Violence,” in Phantasizing the 
Feminine in Indonesia, ed. Laurie Jo Sears (Duke University Press, 1996), 124. 
38
 Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 73. 
39
 Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 70, 138. 
40
 Ruth McVey, "Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics,” in Islam in the Political Process, ed. J.P. 
Piscatori (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 199-225. 
41
 Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class,” 
Indonesia, 56 (1993), 1-35. 
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1974 Marriage Law, and they displayed the same irony as noted above: while intended to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the New Order by strengthening the position of Islam and Islamic 
institutions, at the same time they promoted a relatively liberal interpretation of Islamic law that 
boosted women’s rights in polygamy and divorce.  
The first development along these lines was the enactment in 1989 of a law on the 
Islamic courts.
42
 This law both solidified the legal standing of the Islamic judiciary and made 
changes to the organization and powers of the courts, which put them on the same footing as the 
parallel civil courts. The 1989 Islamic Courts Law also expanded the jurisdiction and powers of 
the courts in a number of ways. The law extended the courts’ matrimonial jurisdiction to include 
child custody disputes, post-divorce support orders, and other matters related to the 
consequences of divorce.
43
 The law also restored the power to decide inheritance disputes that 
had been eliminated in the 1930s.  
The second initiative concerning Islamic law carried out in the latter years of the 
Soeharto regime was the promulgation of a manual of marriage, inheritance, and waqf rules 
called the “Indonesian Compilation of Islamic Law”. The Compilation took the form and style of 
a code, but it was drafted by a committee of judges and Ministry of Religion officials, and given 
effect by means of a presidential instruction. The Compilation purports to be based on a variety 
of classical and contemporary sources of Islamic law. Its marriage law provisions, however, 
essentially restate the 1974 Marriage Law and the regulation implementing the law, thus 
contributing to the acceptability of these provisions and to the improvement of the position of 
women in marriage and divorce. 
Altogether, the women’s movement had very little influence on these changes, which 
were driven primarily by the Ministry of Religion and the Islamic judiciary. Nonetheless, several 
of the early women’s organizations, both Islamic and secular, survived and new groups emerged. 
Their position was reinforced by the fact that the New Order’s economic policies had the 
paradoxical effect that upper middle class women increasingly took up jobs outside of the home. 
This created a new form of consciousness among these women, but it also presented new 
challenges as they were required to carry a double burden of working and managing the home. 
While the large majority of Indonesian women of the poorer classes had always been in such a 
situation, this was something new for the higher classes.
44
 Another development was the 
alignment of many secular women’s organizations with the broader NGO movement that would 
come to play an important part in the toppling of the Soeharto regime. The end of the 1980s saw 
the creation of new women’s NGOs, such as Kalyanamitra, Solidaritas Perempuan and the 
women’s Legal Aid Foundation or APIK, which were quite activist in outlook. These groups 
were funded by Western donors and operated on the basis of a human rights framework, 
reflecting a global development in women’s activism.45 Yet Islamic women’s organizations 
remained active as well. 
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The common goal of resisting an authoritarian regime proved to be a uniting force for the 
women’s movement.  On the eve of Reformasi, the women’s movement looked much like the 
one that existed on the eve of the 1945-1949 revolution, with similar fault lines. At the national 
level it still consisted of secular-oriented, progressive upper middle class women. The Islamic 
women’s organizations continued to share the practical gender interests promoted by secular-
oriented groups, but differed in their view of the strategic agenda. Some organizations supported 
the further implementation of the strategic agenda, whereas others found that it went much too 
far in interfering with Islamic doctrine and advocated rolling back changes made by the 1974 
Marriage Act. Their position was reinforced by the rise of a Muslim middle class that had 
hitherto been largely absent.
46
 We shall now see how this worked out after the demise of the 
New Order. 
 
 
Reformasi and the Role of Women 
 
Resignation of Soeharto and the Reformasi 
 
On 23 February 1998 a group of women calling themselves the “Voice of Concerned Mothers” 
(Suara Ibu Peduli) took to the streets of Jakarta and Surabaya to protest the cost of milk that had 
risen to the point that it was no longer affordable for many average Indonesians. Their protests 
were not the first demonstration of popular dissatisfaction with the Soeharto regime, but they 
proved to be a turning point in the movement to force Soeharto from office. The way in which 
the women framed their protests made it difficult for the New Order to respond in a heavy-
handed manner and paved the way for the student protests that ultimately convinced Soeharto to 
step down.
47
 
The resignation of Soeharto marked the beginning of a number of processes that 
completely restructured Indonesia politically, constitutionally and to some extent socially. These 
processes led to new questions about the position of Islam in the post-Soeharto era, including the 
question of whether Indonesia should remain a multi-religious/secular state or become an Islamic 
state. 
The first of these processes was democratization. Indonesia saw free elections for the first 
time since 1955. A staggering 100 political parties participated in the 1999 elections. About one-
third of these new parties identified themselves as Islamic, but fears among “secularists” that 
they would gain a majority proved unwarranted. On the whole the Islamic parties were not very 
successful. Altogether the parties in favor of turning Indonesia into an Islam-based state received 
less than 25 percent of the vote. This trend was repeated in the elections of 2004 and 2009, and 
observers have noted that political Islam as a legislative force has clearly declined when 
compared to the 1950s.
48
 Likewise, the debate that started in 1998 regarding the question of 
whether Indonesia could have a female president ultimately saw Muslim conservatives 
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unsuccessful in their attempts at preventing Megawati Sukarnoputri from gaining the presidency 
in 2001.
49
 
Secondly, a far-reaching process of political and social liberalization was carried out in 
the adoption of a full range of human rights, first in the 1999 Human Rights Law and later in the 
constitution. Just as citizens used their right to congregate for establishing new political parties 
and civil society organizations, freedom of expression and the press led to establishment of new 
daily newspapers, journals and other media, leading to a pluriform menu of news coverage that 
differed greatly from the state-controlled New Order media. The quick rise of Internet use further 
contributed to this trend, with Indonesia ranked fourth behind the United States, Brazil and India 
in total number of Facebook users by 2013.
50
 Taken together the effects of these changes have 
produced a degree of openness, public debate and widening horizons that appear to have truly 
transformed the country. Indonesians’ access to all sorts of information, including on Islam, has 
moreover caused changes to Indonesian women’s  perceptions of themselves and of their 
position in the world. On the one hand we see extremist readings of Syariah (shariʿa law) 
spreading quickly, but on the other the Internet offers Indonesian Muslims–and women in 
particular–a hitherto unmatched opportunity to inquire into different versions of Islam and how 
to follow Islam in daily practice. Despite these developments, the traditional Indonesian context 
has continued to be the dominant framework for debating gender equality, and access to 
international discourse on gender equality has not had the effect of causing women’s NGOs to 
frame their struggles according to the terms of this discourse (although they may occasionally 
borrow from it).
51
 Finally we should note that the “NGO-ization” of the women’s movement that 
began during the New Order continued during Reformasi. This has changed the nature of the 
movement, as the newly created NGOs were more often focused on single issues than on a 
broad, comprehensive agenda. What this means for the strength of the movement is still the 
subject of debate.
52
 
In addition to introducing democratic controls on the exercise of power by direct election 
of the president and legislature,
53
 the constitutional amendments (1999-2002) put into place 
numerous measures designed to provide “watchdog” controls on the exercise of governmental 
power. The first was a measure to bolster the independence of the judiciary, which had more than 
any other institution suffered under Guided Democracy and the Soeharto regime. One truly 
revolutionary change was the creation of a Constitutional Court vested with the power of 
constitutional review of acts of parliament. This, as we will see, has come to play an extremely 
important role in determining the limits of state intervention in the lives of its citizens and, in 
particular, its women. Secondly, the amendments established several institutions charged with 
the oversight of government actions, most notably the National Human Rights Commission and 
the National Ombudsman. In addition to these constitutional bodies, the National Commission on 
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Violence against Women, better known as Komnas Perempuan, a state body established in 1998, 
has consistently aligned itself with the secular women’s movement.54 
The third process that gained momentum following Reformasi is “Islamization.” This 
refers to the fact that Islam has gained a much more visible presence in Indonesia since the start 
of Reformasi. Indonesians are increasingly understanding their identity in religious terms by 
referring to Muslim symbols and Muslim virtues.
55
 This has also resulted in the emergence of a 
very diverse array of Islamic women’s NGOs, a process promoted by the emergence of a Muslim 
middle class whose female members seek to actively relate Islamic ideas to societal issues.
56
 
Some of these groups, such as Rahima, seek to translate human rights’ issues into an Islamic 
discourse,
57
 but at the same time Islamist women’s groups “work toward the reinforcement of 
male-defined Islamic gender paradigms.”58 Importantly, Islamization has been characterized 
more by debates about the meaning of Islam for individual Muslims than by its effects on the 
institutional arrangements of the state. 
The fourth process set in motion by Reformasi is decentralization. Fearing that 
democratization would give rise to secessionist movements, Soeharto’s immediate successor, 
B.J. Habibie, pushed through the adoption of a Law on Regional Autonomy (22/1999) that 
reversed the highly centralized governmental system of the New Order. While the main 
inspiration for the Regional Autonomy Law was economic, the devolution of governmental 
power led to differentiation in other social realms as well. In some regions this consisted of the 
resurgence of adat, but in other areas district heads and legislatures sought to shore up their 
legitimacy by adopting so-called Syariah bylaws.
59
 While sometimes innocuous and generally 
enforced only inconsistently, these bylaws have nonetheless restricted women’s freedom of 
movement and dress and have had a symbolically oppressive effect. Despite the fact that many of 
these measures seem to be in open violation of human rights guarantees now enshrined in the 
constitution, the central government has been extremely lax in responding to seemingly invalid 
local laws, and has thus contributed to reinforcing gender inequality. This Islamization is most 
extreme in the province of Aceh, which enjoys special autonomy status that grants provincial 
level authorities powers beyond those of other provinces, including with regard to religious 
affairs. Another effect of decentralization has been that national ministries have more difficulty 
in implementing their policies at the regional level,
60
 including the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
(now the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment and the Protection of Children), which has been 
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the main government body working to promote the position of women in all respects, including 
their position in the work force.
61
 
In summary, the changes instituted during the first years of Reformasi were not primarily 
concerned with the position of Islam in the state. Nor were they concerned with the position of 
women in family law and before the Islamic court. However, some tensions between 
liberalization and decentralization have been visible from the start, with the latter potentially 
unleashing conservative forces in many regions that had been tightly controlled under the New 
Order. Moreover, while there was broad agreement that Islam should neither become the basis of 
the state nor that Islamic law should be constitutionally imposed on all Indonesian Muslims, the 
constitution did limit the freedom of religion to some extent. How these changes affected family 
law during the post-Soeharto era is the subject of the next sections.  
 
The Islamic Judiciary in the Post-Reformasi Era and Rising Divorce Numbers 
 
One element of the Indonesian state most in need of reform at the end of the Soeharto era was 
the judiciary. Over the course of Soeharto’s rule the country’s general courts had been rendered 
thoroughly corrupt and incompetent.
62
 Because the degraded state of the courts arose out of 
thirty years of executive branch interference with the judiciary, it was believed that the problem 
could be solved by instituting a separation of executive and judicial powers. 
The Reformasi plan for the judiciary had just one goal: to implement a system of unitary 
supervision or satu atap (one roof). Under the structure that had been in effect since 
independence, supervisory power over the courts was divided between the executive and the 
judicial branches. The Supreme Court had authority over strictly legal matters, meaning the law 
and how it should be applied. The administration of the courts was under the executive–either the 
Ministry of Justice, which had authority over the general courts, or the Ministry of Religion, 
which oversaw the Islamic courts. Under the satu atap structure, the role of the executive would 
be eliminated and the Supreme Court would assume authority over all aspects of the courts. 
Some supporters of the Islamic courts initially resisted including the Islamic courts in the 
restructuring, but those efforts were unsuccessful, and in 2004 the Supreme Court assumed 
supervisory authority over both the general and Islamic courts. 
Neither the transfer of supervisory authority nor any other legal changes carried out as a 
part of Reformasi has had a significant impact on the character or operation of the Islamic courts. 
However, there have been a number of important developments regarding the courts’ caseload in 
recent years. Statistics from the Islamic courts show a staggering increase in the number of 
divorce cases. From 2003 to 2011, the number of divorces decided by the Islamic courts grew at 
an average rate of 10.3 percent per year, including a 14.1 percent increase between 2007 and 
2011. In the nine-year period from 2003 to 2011, the number of divorces decided each year more 
than doubled, from 133,306 to 276,690.
63
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Apart from the overall increase in the number of divorce cases, recent court statistics 
indicate another intriguing change in Muslim divorce behavior: women are filing for divorce 
more frequently than men. Divorces initiated by men and women are based on different 
procedures, and court statistics record divorce filings based on which procedure was used. Court 
records therefore reveal the relative proportion of divorces filed by men and women. In 1996 and 
1997 men and women filed for divorce in approximately equal numbers. In 1998 and in every 
year thereafter, more divorces in Islamic courts were initiated by women than by men. 
Furthermore, while divorce filings by both men and women have increased, divorces initiated by 
women have grown at a much faster rate than divorces by men. Between 1998 and 2011 divorce 
filings by Muslim men grew at an average annual rate of 3.4 percent. Divorce filings by women 
grew more than twice as fast at an average annual rate of 8.1 percent. In 1999, women filed 57.5 
percent of all divorce cases decided by the Islamic courts. In 2011, filings by women accounted 
for 69 percent of all cases. Though not solely responsible for the increase in divorce cases, 
women are asserting their right to leave unwanted marriages in growing numbers.  
Recent changes in divorce behavior and the greater willingness of women to assert their 
rights can be explained only in part by the effects of Reformasi. While events occurring in the 
political realm are not commonly associated with the conduct of family life, a number of studies 
have shown that the values embodied in the political culture have an influence on the intimate 
lives of citizens.
64
 Though not as well-known as some other cases, one of the best examples of 
this phenomenon is the dramatic change in marriage and divorce behavior coinciding with 
Indonesian independence. The institution of marriage in Indonesia was radically transformed in 
the second half of the twentieth century. During the first half of the century, marriage was 
generally understood as an economic partnership in which both spouses contributed to the 
economic support of the family and the marriage system was characterized by early arranged 
marriages and frequent divorce. By the end of the century marriage came to be understood as 
predicated on love and companionship, the matter of when and whom to marry was a matter of 
choice, and marriages were much more stable.  
The changes in marriage behavior in Indonesia in the twentieth century cannot be 
explained by any single factor. Industrialization, modernization, the media, and education all 
played a role in the transformation of the marriage system and the decline in divorce.
65
 But 
another factor contributing to these changes was the set of ideas embodied in Indonesian 
nationalism. As Ruth McVey (1996) has shown, the central ideal animating Indonesian 
nationalism and the independence movement was the concept of kemerdekaan (freedom or 
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emancipation). This was understood first and foremost in relation to Dutch colonial political 
domination, but many Indonesians also felt that the ideal of freedom called for changes to 
established patterns of social life. The “cognitive restructuring”66 underlying the shift in divorce 
behavior was at least in part a result of new ideas about the individual and the state embodied in 
Indonesian nationalism.
67
 
Though not as profound as the impact of Indonesian nationalism, the resignation of 
Soeharto was also accompanied by a sense of liberation. The collapse of the system of military 
and bureaucratic controls constructed during the Soeharto era was experienced as an 
emancipation that resonated throughout Indonesian social life. The social and political upheaval 
that accompanied the change of regime affected the personal lives of Indonesians, just as the 
Indonesian nationalist movement affected family behavior half a century earlier. Although 
Reformasi did not produce significant changes to Muslim family law, the changes in divorce 
behavior in recent years indicate that the political transition has made Indonesian women more 
assertive in the exercise of their rights. 
As several authors have pointed out, the public sphere drastically changed during 
Reformasi. Issues that for thirty years had not been debated publicly suddenly were addressed in 
all kinds of public spaces. Well-established women’s organizations saw an array of new groups 
emerge, some of them stable, others of a temporary nature only. This development was 
supported by Indonesia’s economic recovery, which contributed to the expansion of a middle 
class. The atmosphere of freedom set the stage for debates about issues revolving around Islamic 
law in ways that in some respects are reminiscent of the 1950s, but the debates included many 
more citizens, took place in all kinds of spaces and involved “profound uncertainties not only 
over the meaning of Islam and religiosity but also over the meaning of family and of cultural, 
ethnic and gendered identities.”68 
 
 
Islamic Family Law in the Post-Reformasi Period 
 
The Constitutional Court and Islamic Family Law 
 
One important change made after the fall of Soeharto was the creation of a Constitutional Court 
with the power to review legislation for its conformity to the constitution. As with other 
Reformasi changes to state institutions, the reasons for creating the Constitutional Court were 
unrelated to the role or application of Islamic law. Furthermore, the court was given only a 
limited ability to affect the content of Islamic family law. The court’s constitutional review 
power extends only to a review of legislation; the court does not have the power to review the 
constitutionality of regulations or other types of law created by the executive branch. This means 
that the court can entertain challenges to the 1974 Marriage Act itself, but it lacks jurisdiction to 
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rule on the constitutionality of the implementing regulations for the 1974 Marriage Act or of the 
Compilation of Islamic Law. 
In its ten years of existence, the Constitutional Court has decided only a handful of cases 
dealing with issues related to religion or Islamic law and only two cases that directly related to 
Islamic family law.
69
 These cases are significant because they show how the court has tried to 
avoid the impression that state law overrides Islamic law in order not to undermine the court’s 
legitimacy.  
The first case concerning Islamic law to be heard by the Constitutional Court concerned a 
challenge to the restrictions on polygamy contained in the 1974 Marriage Act. The petition was 
filed by a man named Muhammad Insa. In 2001, Insa married a second wife in a ceremony that 
complied with Islamic requirements but was not formally registered. Six years later, Insa went to 
the local Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama/ KUA), the sub-district-level office 
with responsibility for registering Muslim marriages, to have the marriage registered. The KUA 
officials told Insa that although his marriage was valid it could not be registered because he had 
not received permission from the Islamic court. Insa also consulted with a judge on the Islamic 
court, but was told that were he to petition for permission to enter into polygamy the petition 
would be denied because he did not have the consent of his first wife as required by the 1974 
Marriage Act.
70
 Insa then sought recourse in the Constitutional Court claiming that the 
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restrictions on polygamy contained in the 1974 Marriage Act violated his constitutional right to 
practice his religion.  
The court rejected Insa’s petition in 2007. While the restrictions on polygamy in the 1974 
Marriage Act were upheld, the decision is notable for its reasoning. In finding the limitations on 
polygamy to be valid, the court deemed it unnecessary to address the question as to what, if any, 
restrictions the state can impose on the practice of religion. The court concluded that the 
requirements for polygamy under the 1974 Marriage Act did not abridge Insa’s right to practice 
his religion because the 1974 Marriage Act is fully in accordance with Islamic teachings. Thus, 
the essence of the court’s decision was that Insa’s claim was based on a flawed understanding of 
Islamic law. The court began by stating that because the petitioner had relied on Islamic 
teachings in making his claim, it was necessary for the court to consider those matters as well. 
The court then proceeded to spell out its view of the correct understanding of marriage and 
polygamy under Islamic law. Quoting Qurʾānic texts71 and the testimony of religious scholars 
who testified as witnesses at the hearing,
72
 the court declared that marriage in Islam is in general 
monogamous, and that polygamy is permissible only in particular circumstances. Two conditions 
that must be met before a man may enter into polygamy are that he obtain the opinion and 
consent of his wife and that the man be just. Acting justly, by which the court meant loving one’s 
wives and children equally, is in fact impossible for mere mortals. In the context of polygamy, 
therefore, the word just relates to a man’s ability to adequately provide the social and material 
needs of his wives and children. In accordance with the principle of Islamic jurisprudence that 
“the State shall take care of its people in accordance with the general interest,” the state has the 
authority to specify requirements for entering into polygamy in the interest of the general good, 
especially as it relates to achieving the objective of marriage, that is, the creation of a happy and 
lasting family based on the One Almighty God. 
The judgment in the polygamy case reads more like the decision of a court reviewing the 
law for its conformity to Islamic law than a decision on the scope of constitutionally protected 
religious freedom. The court upheld the restrictions on polygamy based on the belief  that the 
1974 Marriage Act states the correct understanding of Islamic doctrine. In framing the decision 
in these terms, the court was able to avoid entirely the question of what limitations may be 
imposed on the exercise of religion. They did this with good reason, since that question presumes 
that the state has the power to forbid what Islam permits. 
The second case dealing with Islamic family law exemplifies the difficulty of 
implementing human rights guarantees within a political and religious culture in which the 
supposed immutability of Islamic law cannot be publicly questioned. At the heart of the matter 
was the refusal by Soeharto’s former Cabinet Secretary, Moerdiono, to recognize his marriage to 
former starlet Machica Mochtar and his paternity to her son Iqbal. Such recognition would mean 
that Moerdiono had to pay for Iqbal’s maintenance and that Iqbal would be entitled to a share of 
his father’s inheritance. In 2008, the Islamic court for Tiga Raksa in West Java found that 
Moerdiono and Machica had married in a ceremony satisfying the requirements of Islamic law, 
but the court refused to order formal recognition of the marriage on the grounds that Moerdiono 
was already married to another woman at the time of his marriage to Machica and that he had not 
obtained court permission to take a second wife.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
c. There is assurance that the husband will treat his wives and their children fairly. 
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In 2011, Machica and her son filed a petition to the Constitutional Court to invalidate two 
provisions in the 1974 Marriage Act that had the effect of denying the existence of any legal 
relationship between a child born out of wedlock and the child’s father. The first was the article 
requiring registration of marriage. Article 2(1) of the 1974 Marriage Act states that a marriage is 
valid when performed in accordance with the religious law of the parties. Article 2(2) requires 
that all marriages be registered. The question is whether a marriage that satisfies Article 2(1) but 
was not registered must still be considered valid. This issue has been the subject of debate and 
uncertainty since the passage of the 1974 Marriage Act. The Compilation of Islamic Law simply 
perpetuates the uncertainty. It states that a marriage that is not registered does not have “the force 
of law,”73 which is arguably different from the marriage not being valid.  
The Constitutional Court found that the requirement of marriage registration does not 
violate the constitution. The court based this conclusion on a single line in the elucidation to the 
1974 Marriage Act that likens registration of marriage to registration of other life events, such as 
births and deaths. The court’s invocation of the comparison is presumably intended as an 
argument that registration of marriage is no more necessary for the existence of the marriage 
than registration of death is necessary for the reality of the person’s death. By this ruling the 
court perpetuated the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of Article 2(2), as it did not address 
what the legal consequences of this interpretation are.
74
  
However, this question lost much of its importance because of the court’s decision about 
the second provision challenged by the petitioners. The court declared Article 43(1) 
unconstitutional, which states that a child born outside of a marriage has a legal relation with his 
or her mother only. On the basis of little more than ipsa dixit, the court declared that Article 43 
must be read to mean that a child born out of wedlock is legally the offspring of its mother and 
its biological father. The revolutionary nature of this judgment is evident. The court’s decision 
that children born out of wedlock are legitimate contradicts both Sunni jurisprudence and the 
Indonesian Compilation of Islamic Law, along with longstanding Indonesian practice. Missing 
from the court’s reasoning is any discussion of the constitution. The court apparently considered 
it best to leave the premise of the decision unstated–that state law trumps religious doctrine. In 
stark contrast to the polygamy case discussed above, the court avoided any discussion of Islamic 
doctrine on the subject of children born outside of marriage. The difficulty of reconciling the 
court’s decision with standard Islamic teachings on the subject probably made the court think 
twice before trying this.  
As could be expected, this decision by the Constitutional Court provoked a harsh reaction 
from conservative Muslims. In March of 2011, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), a quasi-
governmental body set up during the Soeharto years, issued a fatwa contradicting the decision 
that children’s rights automatically flow from a natural blood relationship with the biological 
father. In its stead, the MUI called upon the government to impose an obligation on fathers to 
maintain their biological children and grant them an obligatory bequest (wasiat wajibah, Arabic: 
waṣīya wājib) not based on their status as fathers but as a penalty (hukuman ta’zir, Arabic: 
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ḥukman taʾzīr) for their adulterous behavior. Thus, the MUI attempted to preserve clear Islamic 
law prescriptions concerning blood relationships whilst considering the rights and welfare of 
children born out of wedlock.
75
 More recently, an Indonesian newspaper reported that the 
Ministry of Religion is preparing regulations to deal with the issue.
76
 In the meantime, the 
Supreme Court has instructed judges serving on Islamic courts that children born out of wedlock 
could be declared legitimate based on a judicial decree that the child’s parents were married in 
accordance with Islamic law.
77
 This would enable children born in an unregistered marriage to 
seek enforcement of support and inheritance rights from their biological fathers. While reliable 
estimates of the number of unregistered marriages are not available, it is believed that such 
marriages are common. The Supreme Court circular on the subject does not address the much 
thornier situation of children born to parents who never married. 
In conclusion, the number of Islamic family law cases submitted to the Constitutional 
Court may be small, but the court has certainly demonstrated its capability to promote 
breakthroughs in legal interpretation.  
 
Post-Reformasi Law Reform Initiatives 
 
Since the fall of Soeharto, both liberal and orthodox Muslim voices have pressed their agendas 
freely and vigorously. Against the background of this debate, the administration of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (president from 2001-2004) decided in 2002 to raise the legal status of the 
Compilation of Islamic Law from an executive order promulgated through a presidential decree 
to that of a statute passed by the legislature. In the years since 2002, three different bills on 
substantive family law have been drafted and presented to the public. Each of the proposals 
provoked substantial controversy, and none of the bills have been enacted. 
The first proposal, called the Bill on Substantive Law for the Islamic Court (Rancangan 
Undang-Undang Hukum Terapan Peradilan Agama), was presented to parliament in 2003 by the 
Ministry of Religion. The committee that drafted the bill was comprised of representatives from 
the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Religion, and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. 
Several of these representatives  had played leading roles in the creation of the Compilation. The 
stated goal of the bill was to raise the status of the Compilation from presidential decree to 
statutory law. The core members of the drafting committee came from career Islamic courts 
officials. It is not surprising, therefore, that the bill proposed by the committee did not include 
substantial changes to the law. This disappointed more liberal Muslims who felt the bill should 
better reflect the developments within Indonesian Islam, both before and after the Compilation 
was introduced. Indonesian Muslim scholars had produced a wealth of scholarship that paved the 
way for reinterpretations of traditional Islamic doctrines,
78
 and women’s rights activists within 
the main Muslim organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah had long promoted 
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gender-sensitive reinterpretations of Islamic law.
79
 Thus, protests came from both women’s 
rights groups and moderate Muslim organizations. In the face of this criticism further 
consideration of the 2003 Bill was put on hold. 
Although it was never acted on by the legislature, the 2003 Bill was the impetus for the 
creation of a radically different alternative to the Compilation of Islamic Law called the Counter 
Legal Draft (CLD). The CLD was prepared by a committee under the leadership of Siti Musdah 
Mulia, a lecturer at the Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah and a well-known women’s rights 
activist.  During the period that the CLD was drafted, Musdah Mulia held the position of special 
advisor to the Minister of Religion charged with implementing a policy of “gender-
mainstreaming” and promoting women’s interests across the full range of government 
institutions and programs that had been established in 2000 by the administration of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid. The drafters aimed at producing a radical revision of the Compilation of 
Islamic Law, and approached Islamic norms from a democratic, pluralistic, human rights, and 
gender-sensitive perspective. In explaining the CLD, Musdah Mulia wrote that the Compilation 
was not adapted to the needs of Indonesia in the light of the dynamic social changes taking place 
in the country: 
 
The existence of a single uniform reference [the Compilation] has stymied creativity and adaptation 
within the law. Because the answers to legal issues are readily available in the Compilation, judges no 
longer feel the need to engage with the rich literature of the Islamic legal tradition. This in turn has 
stultified the exercise of independent reasoning (ijtihād) and effectively imprisoned Muslims in a 
legal straightjacket.
80
 
 
The CLD was presented to parliament in October 2004. It proposed a range of reforms that 
would have significantly increased the level of gender-equality in Indonesian family law. The 
proposed marriage law reforms included changing the minimum age of marriage to nineteen for 
both husband and wife (at the time, and at present, the minimum age of marriage is nineteen 
years for the husband and sixteen years for the wife); eliminating the requirement of a marriage 
guardian for women who have reached the age of twenty-one and thereby giving them more 
autonomy in choosing a spouse; making the payment of mahr (dowry) obligatory on both 
spouses rather than a gift by the husband’s family to the wife (often conceived as payment for 
the wife’s obedience); extending the principle of nusyuz (Arabic: nushūz), a term often translated 
as “disobedience” of the wife, to both spouses and thereby making marital duties and obligations 
fully equal and mutual; and imposing a waiting period (idda, Arabic: ʿidda) on a husband as well 
as a wife following divorce. Finally, the CLD proposed eliminating the inequality between men 
and women under the law of inheritance granting daughters the same share as sons, a clear break 
with prescriptions in the Qurʾān. 
In addition to the reforms aiming at increasing gender-equality, the CLD proposed four 
other changes that might be considered as conflicting with traditional Muslim norms. First, all 
marriages would have to be registered to be valid (sah, Arabic: ṣaḥ). As discussed earlier, this 
has long been the subject of controversy in Indonesia, and making registration a requirement for 
a marriage to be valid could be seen as secularizing the institution of marriage. Indeed, at present 
Indonesian Islamic courts generally regard compliance with religious stipulations to be sufficient 
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for a marriage to be recognized by the state.
81
 The second change was that the CLD would 
prohibit polygamy entirely. The third was that the CLD would eliminate difference of religion as 
a bar to marriage, which was in direct contrast to the Compilation of Islamic Law which 
prohibited inter-religious marriage more broadly than traditional doctrine in prohibiting all 
Muslims from marrying a non-Muslim. Finally, the CLD would have also eliminated religious 
difference as an impediment to inheritance by stipulating that heirs of any religion are equally 
entitled to inherit from a Muslim. 
Considering the number and the scope of proposed reforms, it is hardly surprising that the 
CLD was not well received. Criticism of the CLD was not limited to conservative Muslims; 
representatives of moderate Muslim organizations were quick to voice their disapproval as well. 
The Majelis Ulama Indonesia, which has become increasingly conservative in recent years, 
issued a statement calling for the withdrawal of the CLD and the resignation of the committee’s 
vice-chair. Ali Mustafa Yaqub declared it the work of the devil (hukum iblis). Din Syamsuddin, 
the Chair of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, deemed the proposed reforms absurd, and 
Huzaemah Tahido Yanggo of the Syariah council of the NU stated that the CLD had damaged 
Islamic teachings.
82
 
The polygamy provisions of the CLD became a focus of particular controversy. Previous 
efforts to limit or prohibit polygamy had been supported by many Muslim women’s 
organizations. However, the Reformasi era witnessed the emergence of a pro-polygamy 
discourse with a broader base of support than the usual voices expressing resistance to 
prohibiting the practice. This included well-known public figures such as businessman Puspo 
Wardoyo and dangdut pop star Rhoma Irama, as well as a group of “hip” young preachers 
unwilling to condemn the practice. This change in discourse was further facilitated by the 
adoption of an attitude of resignation by upper middle class women involved in polygamous 
marriages. This acceptance of polygamy stood in stark contrast to the response of women from 
an earlier era, such as Soekarno’s first wife, Fatmawati, who left the palace after Soekarno took a 
second wife.
83
 
As a result of the controversy over the CLD, the Ministry of Religion formally withdrew 
the proposal from consideration within a few weeks of its presentation. In 2005, the gender-
mainstreaming team in the Ministry of Religion was abolished. This reaction is hardly surprising 
considering the breadth and depth of opposition to the proposal and the generally conservative 
character of the Ministry of Religion. From a purely legal perspective, the CLD is not only 
acceptable but compulsory since it simply harmonized Muslim family law with constitutionally 
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guaranteed equality for women. But the fact that the CLD was formulated in an Islamic idiom 
and applied Islamic sources and modes of deduction did not prevent its rejection by most 
representatives of moderate Islam. Hooker has argued that from the perspective of traditional 
fiqh the broad rejection of the CLD was “wholly understandable.”84 But perhaps it is more 
accurate to state that the CLD did not fit in the tradition of Islamic law and the Islamic courts in 
Indonesia, as many Reformasi or Dutch civil law norms in the 1974 Marriage Act and the 
Compilation of Islamic Marriage are also in direct conflict with traditional fiqh, let alone 
procedural law. Those reforms have been accepted by most of the Indonesian ʿulamāʾ for 
decades if not centuries.
85
 The CLD, however, was a bridge too far in the gradual development 
of family law in Indonesia, even if it was justified in Islamic terms and presented its changes as 
logical outcomes of this development. 
The withdrawal of the CLD from consideration did not put an end to the effort to regulate 
the matrimonial law to be applied in the Islamic courts. In 2010, a new revision of the 
Compilation of Islamic Law, entitled the Bill on Substantive Law in the Islamic Court (Bill of 
2010), was presented to the public by the government. The Bill of 2010’s objective was to 
upgrade the Compilation to a statutory law. Unlike the CLD, the Bill of 2010 for the most part is 
a copy of the current Compilation. Even so, the Bill of 2010 proposed a number of controversial 
reforms. The reforms that have attracted the most attention from the media are those that would 
criminalize unregistered marriages, informal polygamous marriages, and temporary marriages 
(nikah mut’ah, Arabic: nikāḥ al-mutʿa), as well as unauthorized talak divorces. Initially, it 
seemed that the Indonesian women’s organizations applauded the proposed criminalization of 
unregistered marriage when the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas 
Perempuan stated its support,
86
 but soon a coalition of women’s organizations pointed at the 
gender-neutral character of the provisions. The coalition realized that the wives in informal 
marriages would face the same legal consequences as the husband, and, in order not to 
jeopardize the wives as “victims” of such detrimental marriages, Komnas Perempuan changed 
their stance and opposed the bill.
87
 Surprisingly, there has been no debate about the more 
fundamental question of whether the Islamic court should be given jurisdiction in criminal cases. 
The Bill of 2010 stipulates that the Islamic court adjudicates the criminal cases involving illegal 
Muslim marriage and divorce only after the prosecutor has taken up a case based on a police 
investigation. Were this change to be enacted, the entry of the police and the prosecutor into the 
Islamic court would mean a significant change to the traditional civil character of the Islamic 
court. 
Another reform in the Bill of 2010 that attracted media attention was a provision not 
contained in the Compilation of Islamic Law. This provision required that a foreign man wishing 
to marry an Indonesian woman must deposit Rp 500 million (approximately € 35.000) at a 
shariʿa bank account as a financial guarantee for the wife. The stipulation was criticized because 
it would impinge on the freedom to choose a spouse and because of the negative image that it 
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might create of Indonesian Muslim brides constituting a commodity.
88
 A third large reform in the 
bill (also not contained in the Compilation) concerns marriage after pregnancies out of wedlock. 
When a woman is found pregnant as a result of an extramarital sexual relationship (zina, Arabic: 
zināʾ), she can be married to (dapat dikawinkan dengan) the man who impregnated her provided 
the marriage is carried out during the early stages of the pregnancy. If the husband refuses the 
marriage, he faces three months imprisonment. The provision was intended to protect the 
interests of the child. If the child is born within 180 days of the marriage, it would be considered 
to have been born to a valid marriage and thus have the same legal status as a child conceived 
during a valid marriage. In the case of pregnancy after rape, a woman is allowed to marry a man 
other than the rapist during the pregnancy in order to prevent the child being born out of 
wedlock. 
Other revisions to the Compilation of Islamic Law include the proposed increase of the 
marriage age from sixteen to eighteen years for women and from eighteen to twenty-one years 
for men. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill justified this by arguing that the minimum 
age of marriage should be raised in order to ensure that the spouses are mature enough to marry. 
Many Indonesian women marry below the age of eighteen
89
 and the reforms thus constitute a 
significant deviation from social practice. A second revision proposes proposes that both men 
and women can be declared disobedient or nusyuz (Arabic: nushūz) when they fail to fulfill their 
marital duties, and that a woman is entitled to divorce on these grounds. A third states that when 
the wife is pregnant at the time of divorce, the husband is required to provide support during the 
waiting period regardless of whether the divorce is final and even if the wife has been found to 
be nusyuz. A fourth addition concerns a change in the polygamy procedures. The Bill of 2010 
eliminates the right of a wife to appeal a decision granting the husband permission to enter a 
polygamous marriage, even if she did not consent to the marriage. This provision might 
effectively nullify the requirement that the wife give permission for her husband’s polygamy as it 
would provide the judge with broader discretion in polygamy cases. 
The fate of the Bill of 2010 is uncertain. Following its presentation, it attracted extensive 
media attention and heated debates. At present, the bill is surrounded with silence, but 
deliberation is still ongoing. The CLD had proposed major reforms and a totally gender-equal 
Muslim marriage law. The drafters had based all of its provisions on reinterpretations of Islamic 
law, but the scope of the reforms proved unacceptable to even moderate Muslim organizations, 
and consequently formal deliberation of the CLD was almost immediately halted. The 
explanation for the different treatment of both bills might be that the substantive norms of the 
CLD, although framed in an Islamic discourse, clearly transgressed the parameters of what is 
acceptable practice in the Islamic court. Conversely, the Bills on Substantive Muslim Family 
Law were built on the existing legal framework of the Compilation of Islamic Law. Only the 
new criminal provisions on informal marriages in the Bill of 2010, depart from the civil law 
character of the Indonesian Islamic court tradition and would entail greater state intervention in 
(and thus a further secularization of) Muslim marriage. Predictably, those provisions proved 
controversial, whereas the other reforms in the Bill of 2010, important as they might be, have 
been largely overlooked. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Reformasi movement in Indonesia was inspired by the ideals of constitutionalism, 
democracy, and human rights, and while the movement resulted in major changes to the structure 
of the Indonesian state it did not significantly influence developments in the field of family law. 
Viewed from a long-term perspective, we see a gradual process of improvement of the position 
of women in Islamic family law over the course of the past hundred years. The Indonesian 
women’s movement, which developed simultaneously with the Indonesian nationalist project in 
the early part of the twentieth century, has been a key player in this process both before and after 
Reformasi. The character and sphere of action of women’s organizations has changed with 
changing social and political circumstances, but throughout the period the women’s movement 
has been the most consistent force for reform of the law governing family relations. 
Reformasi may not have had a revolutionary impact on Islamic family law or the 
institutions that apply it, but it seems likely that the socially liberating effect of Reformasi is in 
part responsible for the increase in divorce filings by women. While the political changes 
following the fall of Soeharto did not result in changes to the law, the affirmation of human 
rights did have the effect of empowering women to be more assertive in exercising their existing 
rights to divorce. The effects of Reformasi are also apparent in the decision by the Constitutional 
Court regarding the status of children born out of wedlock. Muslims committed to conservative 
interpretations of Islamic family law are a powerful force in Indonesian society, and changes to 
the law will probably be cautious and incremental. Nevertheless, the trajectory of developments 
since Reformasi indicates that in the future human rights norms will play an increasing role in the 
interpretation of Indonesian Islamic law. 
Whether that debate will be conducted in human rights terms is another matter, however. 
The post-Soeharto debates over family law legislation reveal an important change in the 
Indonesian women’s movement that is more a result of changes in society than an effect of 
Reformasi. The divide between those advocating for equal rights for women and those 
supporting the assignment of differential rights and responsibilities according to gender is still 
present today, yet the terms of the debate have changed. In the past the advocates for the rights of 
women framed their arguments in terms of the values of secular nationalism. As evidenced by 
the CLD, the current debate primarily revolves around differing interpretations of Islamic law. In 
this regard we believe that developments in Indonesia may prove to be a portent for 
developments elsewhere in the Muslim world. The debate over women’s rights in Indonesia has 
largely shifted from a debate over whether Islamic law should be applied to Muslims to a debate 
over the content of Islamic family law. The issue has come to be framed in this manner because 
circumstances there have allowed for a more open debate about Islamic law than in most other 
Muslim countries and this debate has been promoted by the broader changes in the public debate 
after Reformasi. While narrow literalist interpretations of Islamic law continue to have 
supporters in Indonesia and elsewhere, the values of freedom and equality have a powerful 
appeal to people regardless of their religion. 
